We show that the two NP-complete problems of Dodgson Score and Young Score have differing computational complexities when the winner is close to being a Condorcet winner. On the one hand, we present an efficient fixed-parameter algorithm for determining a Condorcet winner in Dodgson elections by a minimum number of switches in the votes. On the other hand, we prove that the corresponding problem for Young elections, where one has to delete votes instead of performing switches, is W[2]-complete. In addition, we study Dodgson elections that allow ties between the candidates and give fixed-parameter tractability as well as W[2]-completeness results depending on the cost model for switching ties.
Introduction
Computational social choice and, more specifically, the computational complexity of election systems has become an increasingly important field of interdisciplinary research [4, 11] . The analysis of election systems has applications in computational politics; for example, preference aggregation via various election systems, and in multiagent systems when groups of software agents have to make a joint decision. Election systems play a central role in planning (artificial intelligence in general) and page ranking systems for Internet search engines.
We study the following classic scenario for election systems: a classic election system consists of a set of candidates and a set of vote(r)s. Each voter chooses an order of preference (total order) among the candidates. The well-known Condorcet principle from 1785 [6] then requires that a winner of an election is the candidate who is preferred to each other candidate in more than half of the votes. Unfortunately, a Condorcet winner does not always exist. Hence, several voting systems have been proposed which always choose the Condorcet winner if one exists, and, otherwise, pick a candidate that is in some sense closest to being a Condorcet winner. In other words, these election systems deal with certain "editing problems". In this work, we focus on two classic editing problems from social choice theory [22] , one due to C. L. Dodgson 2 from 1876 [8] and one due to H. P. Young from 1977 [26] . In Dodgson elections, the editing operation is to switch neighboring candidates in the voters' preference lists and the goal is to minimize the overall number of switches needed in order to result in a Condorcet winner. In Young elections, the editing operation is to remove a vote, trying to minimize the number of removals in order to end up with a Condorcet winner.
In their seminal work, Bartholdi et al. [1] initiated the study of the computational complexity of election systems. 3 They showed that to decide whether a distinguished candidate can be made a Condorcet winner by performing no more than a given number of editing operations is NP-complete for both Dodgson and Young elections. In a further breakthrough, for Dodgson elections Hemaspaandra et al. [16] and later for Young elections Rothe et al. [25] showed that the corresponding winner and ranking problems are even complete for Θ p 2 , the class of problems that can be solved via parallel access to NP. Faliszewski et al. [11] concluded that "since checking whether a given candidate has won should be in polynomial time in any system to be put into actual use, these results show that Dodgson and Young elections are unlikely to be useful in practice". This conclusion is valid if analysis terminates once a problem has been shown to be NP-complete. However, classical analysis is only the beginning step for important computational problems. We propose the framework of parameterized computational complexity theory [10, 13, 24] for studying election systems, offering the next step towards finding an optimal 2 Also known as the writer Lewis Carroll. 3 In the meantime, there are many publications presenting classical complexity results for election systems, for example, see [7, 15, 17, 23, 27] . Table 1 Parameterized complexity of Dodgson Score and (Dual) Young Score with respect to different parameters. In case of fixed-parameter tractability we also give information about the (exponential terms of the) corresponding running times. Herein, "ILP" means that fixed-parameter tractability follows by an integer linear program and a result of Lenstra [19] implying impractical running times. Bold-faced results are new, the FPT-results for the parameter "number of candidates" can be directly obtained from [1, 26] , and the FPT-results for the Young elections with respect to the number of votes are trivial. Note that whereas the parameterized complexity of Dodgson Score with respect to the number of votes is open, it is solvable in polynomial time for a constant number of votes [1] . solution.
4
For Dodgson and Young elections, we consider the question of whether the NP-hard problems become fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) with respect to the parameter "number of editing operations". In parameterized complexity [10, 13, 24] the solution size typically is the standard parameter. Thus, we choose this standard parameterization as a natural first step towards a systematic (future) study using further parameterizations. As we can show, other than in the classical context, the parameterized complexity of Dodgson and Young elections completely differs. Having n votes and m candidates, for Dodgson elections we can determine in O(2 k · nk + nm) time whether a distinguished candidate can be made a Condorcet winner by performing at most k switches, that is, the problem is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the parameter k. In contrast, for Young elections the corresponding problem with the parameter denoting either the number of deleted votes or the number of remaining votes becomes W[2]-complete. Indeed, this "parameterized tractability gap" between Dodgson and Young elections is not completely surprising in the sense that in the case of Young the allowed editing operation is much more powerful than in the case of Dodgson. Our results imply that Dodgson elections can be put into actual use whenever the input instances are close to having a Condorcet winner. This answers an open question of Christian et al. [5] 5 and refutes a parameterized hardness conjecture of McCabe- 4 We remark that in parallel work a parameterized complexity study has been initiated for Kemeny elections as well [2] . Therein, a number of positive algorithmic results are achieved. 5 Fellows et al. independently showed that Dodgson Score is fixed-parameter tractable, but with a higher running time [12] .
Dansted [20] . Other natural parameters in the context of voting systems are the "number of votes n" and the "number of candidates m". Regarding the parameter m, for both voting systems there are integer linear programs that imply fixed-parameter tractability [1, 26] . Concerning the parameter n there is a trivial 2 n · poly(m, n)-time algorithm for Young elections. An overview of the parameterized complexity with respect to the different parameters is given in Table 1 . Our results complement recent work on a simple greedy heuristic for finding Dodgson winners with a guaranteed frequency of success [18] and some work on the polynomial-time approximability of Dodgson and Young elections [3, 21] . In particular, Caragiannis et al. [3] gave (randomized) approximation algorithms for Dodgson elections and showed that it is hard to approximate Young elections by any factor. Moreover, for Dodgson elections we can show that allowing ties (that is, votes may remain undecided between certain candidates), depending on the choice between two switching mechanisms, we either obtain fixed-parameter tractability or W[2]-completeness.
Preliminaries
Throughout this work, an election (V, C) consists of a set V of n votes and a set C of m candidates. 6 A vote is a preference list of the candidates, that is, for each voter the candidates are ordered by preference. For three candidates a, b, c, the ordering c > b > a means that candidate c is liked best and candidate a is liked least by this voter. In an election (V, C), a candidate c ∈ C is called the Condorcet winner if c wins against every other candidate from C. That is, for each d ∈ C\{c}, candidate c is better liked than d in at least ⌊n/2⌋ + 1 votes. Observe that a Condorcet winner does not always exist. A switch is defined to be the swapping of two neighboring candidates in a vote. We now introduce the basic computational problems of this work:
Dodgson Score: Given: An election (V, C), a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and an integer k ≥ 0. Question: Can c be made a Condorcet winner by at most k switches?
In other words, for Dodgson Score, we ask whether the Dodgson score of c is at most k. The Young score is defined by the number of remaining votes:
Young Score: Given: An election (V, C), a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and an integer l ≥ 0. Question: Is there a subset V ′ ⊆ V of size at least l such that (V ′ , C) has 6 Note that we identify votes and voters.
the Condorcet winner c?
The dual Young score is defined by the number of removed votes:
Given: An election (V, C), a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, and an integer k ≥ 0. Question: Is there a subset V ′ ⊆ V of size at most k such that (V \V ′ , C) has the Condorcet winner c?
All three problems are NP-complete [1, 25] .
Finally, we briefly introduce the relevant notions of parameterized complexity theory [10, 13, 24] . Parameterized algorithmics aims at a multivariate (at least two-dimensional) complexity analysis of problems. This is done by studying relevant problem parameters and their influence on the computational complexity of problems. The hope lies in accepting the seemingly inevitable combinatorial explosion for NP-hard problems, but to confine it to a specific parameter. In our context, the studied parameters will be the numbers k and l of allowed edit operations. Hence, the decisive question is whether a given parameterized problem is fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) with respect to the parameter, say k. In other words, here we ask for the existence of a solving algorithm with running time f (k)·poly(n, m) for some computable function f . Unfortunately, not all parameterized problems are fixed-parameter tractable. Downey and Fellows [10] developed a theory of parameterized intractability by means of devising a completeness program with complexity classes. The first two levels of (presumable) parameterized intractability are captured by the complexity classes W [1] and W [2] . We will show several W[2]-completeness results. It is commonly believed that the corresponding problems thus are not fixed-parameter tractable. To this end, a reduction concept is needed. A parameterized reduction reduces a problem instance (I, k) in f (k) · poly(|I|) time to an instance (I ′ , k ′ ) such that (I, k) is a yes-instance if and only if (I ′ , k ′ ) is a yes-instance and k ′ only depends on k but not on |I|.
Dodgson Score
In this section, we describe an efficient fixed-parameter algorithm based on dynamic programming for the problem Dodgson Score parameterized by the score. This answers an open question of Christian et al. [5] . The algorithm not only decides whether a given Dodgson Score instance is a "yes"-instance, but for a "yes"-instance also constructs a set of at most k switches which lead to a modified input instance where the distinguished candidate c becomes a Condorcet winner. The basic idea of the algorithm is that a solution can be decomposed into subsolutions. In each subsolution the deficit of each dirty candidate is decreased by a certain amount, the partial decrement. More precisely, our dynamic programming considers a linear number of subsets of votes, beginning with the subset that contains only one vote and then extending it by adding the other votes one by one. For each of these vote subsets, we consider all possible combinations of partial decrements of deficits. For each such combination, the computation of an optimal solution achieving the partial decrements is based on the optimal solutions for the previously considered smaller subset. At the last vote, we can then construct an overall optimal solution based on the "partial" optimal solutions computed before.
In the following, we first describe a general version of the algorithm, which we also use to solve a generalized version of Dodgson Score (see Subsection 3.3). Then we show how to further improve the running time of this algorithm for Dodgson Score.
Definitions for the Algorithm
Let c be the distinguished candidate and let C d = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c p ) denote the list of candidates with positive deficit in an arbitrary but fixed order. Let
The dynamic programming table is denoted by T , each row corresponding to a vote v i for i = 1, . . . , n and each column corresponding to a partial deficit list
) stores an integer equal to the minimum number of switches within the votes {v j | 1 ≤ j ≤ i} such that in a resulting instance the deficits of the p dirty candidates are at most d
′ p ) cannot be achieved by switching within the set of votes
Let switch(v i , c j ) denote the minimum number of switches needed such that in vote v i candidate c defeats candidate
) and a subset of indices S ⊆ {1, . . . , p}, we use D ′ + S to denote a deficit list (e 1 , . . . , e p ) where
Let best(S, v i ) denote the candidate c j with j ∈ S such that c j is liked better than each other candidate in {c r | r ∈ S, r = j} in vote v i .
Algorithm
The dynamic programming algorithm for Dodgson Score is given in Figure 1 . We assume that we already have the deficits of the candidates and that the sum of the deficits of the dirty candidates is at most k as argued in Observation 2. In the initialization of the first row of the dynamic programming table (Figure 1 , lines 4-6), the algorithm considers all possible combinations of deficit decrements that can be achieved by switches within the first vote, and stores an integer equal to the minimum number of switches needed for each of them. In the update (lines 7-11), the subset of votes {v 1 , . . . , v i−1 } is extended by a new vote v i and for the new subset {v 1 , . . . , v i } a solution for all partial deficit lists is computed by combining a number of switches within the new vote v i with information already stored in the table T .
Lemma 1
The algorithm DodScore (Figure 1 ) is correct.
PROOF. Concerning the correctness of the initialization, note that the first for-loop (lines 1-3) merely sets all table entries to "+∞". Hence it suffices to show that DodScore assigns the correct number of switches to all entries of 7 Using "at most" in the definition of table entries, we do not have to consider
In this way, the case that an optimal solution may decrease the deficit of a dirty candidate to a negative value is also covered.
Algorithm DodScore Input: Set of votes V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }, set of candidates C, set of dirty
Yes, if c can become a Condorcet winner with at most k switches Initialization: the first row with partial deficit lists that can be achieved by switching within the first vote v 1 (lines 4-6). Since in one vote the deficit of every candidate can be reduced by at most one, it is sufficient to iterate over all possible subsets S of {1, . . . , p} and to reduce the original deficits of the corresponding candidates by one. Thereby, an entry can only become less than +∞ if c can be improved upon all candidates with indices in S (line 5). Moreover, the minimum number of switches is obviously the number of switches needed to improve c upon the candidate that is best in vote v 1 among the candidates c j with j ∈ S, which is given by switch(v 1 , best(S, v 1 )).
The computation of an entry T (v i , D ′ ) with i ≥ 2 is based on the fact that the decrement from D to D ′ can be split into two parts. One part needs to be achieved by switches in vote v i and the other one by switches in votes v 1 , . . . , v i−1 . The minimum number of switches needed for the corresponding splitting possibilities is stored in T (v i , D ′ ). Moreover, since the switches in v i can decrease the deficit of one dirty candidate by at most one, every possible way of splitting the deficit decrement can be represented by a subset S of {1, . . . , p}. Each subset S has the meaning that, by the switches in v i , the deficits of the dirty candidates with indices in S should be decreased by exactly one; the rest of the decrement from D to D ′ has to be achieved by switches in v 1 , . . . , v i−1 . According to the definition of the table T , the minimum number of switches to achieve the latter is stored in the already
As argued for the initialization, switch(v i , best(S, v i )) returns the minimum number of switches to decrease the deficit of the candidates with indices in S. Therefore, lines 9-11 of DodScore compute T (v i , D ′ ) correctly.
Since DodScore computes the table T correctly, we can conclude that a given instance is a yes-instance if and only if T (v n , (0, . . . , 0)) ≤ k (lines 12 and 13). 2
Lemma 2
The algorithm DodScore (Figure 1) 
. Clearly, for a potential "yes"-instance, we have the constraints p ≤ k and
and 2). It is not hard to see that 2
k is a tight upper bound on
For computing an entry T (v i , D ′ ), the algorithm iterates over all 2 p subsets of {1, . . . , p}. For each such subset S, it computes the "distance" in v i between the best of the dirty candidates with indices in S and c, that is, the number of switches needed to make c better than this best dirty candidate. This distance can be computed in O(k) time and, hence, the computation of
By making use of a "monotonicity property" of the table, we can improve the running time of DodScore as shown in the following theorem.
PROOF. The improvement compared to Lemma 2 is achieved by replacing the innermost for-loop (lines 9-11 in Figure 1 ) of the update step which computes a table entry and needs O(2 k · k) time by an instruction running in time linear in k.
For d ∈ C\{c}, let S i (d) denote the set of the dirty candidates that are better than the distinguished candidate c but not better than the candidate d in
We replace lines 9-11 in Figure 1 by the recurrence
To prove the correctness of the recurrence, on the one hand, observe that, for every r with 1 ≤ r ≤ p, there exists a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , p} satisfying the if-condition in line 10 of DodScore such that S = S i (c r ) and best(S,
On the other hand, for every S ⊆ {1, . . . , p} satisfying the if-condition in line 10, there exists an r with 1 ≤ r ≤ p such that S ⊆ S i (c r ). For instance, let r be the index of the candidate in S that is the best in v i ; we then have best(S, v i ) = c r and, thus, switch
Moreover, from the definition of table entries, the following monotonicity of the table T is easy to verify: 
The time for computing a table entry in the improved version is clearly O(k): Before looking for the minimum, we can compute S i (c r ) for all 1 ≤ r ≤ p by iterating one time over v i . Then, based on Lemma 2, the overall running time becomes O(2 k · nk + nm). 2
Allowing Ties
Sometimes it might be desirable to allow a voter to rank two or more candidates equally. This leads to an election based on votes with ties. As noted by Hemaspaandra et al. [16] , there are (at least) two different natural models on how to generalize Dodgson Score to the case with ties. The models differ in the "power" of one switch. In the first model, transforming a = b > c into c > a = b requires just one switch and in the second model this requires two separate switches. The ranking and the winner versions remain Θ p 2 -complete in both cases [16] .
Formally, a vote with ties can be considered as a total order of disjoint sets of candidates. To ease the presentation, we often write just "> c >" instead of "> {c} >".
Recall In the second model, the switch operation becomes less powerful, that is, the distinguished candidate can only improve upon one candidate by one switch.
Here, one has to consider the following situations:
• ". The problem of computing the Dodgson score for this model is denoted as Dodgson Tie Score 2 (DTS2). The considered model is very general in the sense that it allows to choose to improve the distinguished canidate only upon a subset of equally ranked candidates and thus it is only "charged" to pay for this subset. A reasonable special case of this model is to restrict B ′ to be idential with B, that is, to allow only to switch the distinguished candidate with the whole subset. For this case, we can directly use the improved version of the algorithm DodScore as described in the proof of Theorem 1 by treating the whole set of tied candidates as one possibility. This yields an algorithm with running time O(2 k · nk + nm).
Note that for both models, a switch as defined for the case without ties can be simulated by two switches.
Whereas DTS1 and DTS2 remain NP-complete (which easily follows from the NP-completeness of the case without ties [1] ), their parameterized complexity differs. The problem DTS2 is fixed-parameter tractable while DTS1 is W[2]-complete.
To show the fixed-parameter tractability of DTS2 one can use a slight modification of algorithm DodScore from Figure 1 . However, for DTS2 we obtain a slightly worse running time than for Dodgson Score without ties as given in Theorem 1. Since we do not have a total ordering of candidates in the votes, we cannot make use of the monotonicity property employed in the proof of Theorem 1, thus, returning to the algorithm used for Lemma 1.
Theorem 2 Dodgson Tie Score 2 can be solved in O(6 k · nk + nm) time.
PROOF. We use a slight modification of algorithm DodScore (Figure 1 ) to solve DTS2. In the DTS2 model, one switch can decrease the deficit of at most one candidate by at most one. Thus, it holds that the sum of all deficits is bounded by the number of total switches. In lines 05 and 10 of Figure 1 , we replace the phrase "c j defeats c" by "c does not defeat c j " to include the possibility that c and c j are tied. Next, we redefine the switch function for the update and initialization steps (used in lines 06 and 11 of Figure 1) .
. . denote an arbitrary vote from V . Consider a non-empty subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , p} in the computation of the entry T (v i , D ′ ). The set S has non-empty intersections with some of the candidate subsets S j , j ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Let S b denote the subset S j , j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, with smallest index such that U := S j ∩ S is not empty. We distinguish two cases. First, b = r. In this case, we only have to break the ties of c with all candidates from U. Hence, in this case, we can define switch(v i , S) := |U| and do not need any further modifications. The second case is b < r. Here, we also need to decrease the deficit of all candidates of S by at least one. The way to achieve this with a minimum number of switches is to switch c so far that it is tied with all candidates from U. This requires one switch for all candidates in U ∪ S r and two switches for all candidates from b<j<r S j . Hence, in this case, we set switch(v i , S) :
Further, in this case we have to adapt the definition of D + S used in line 10 such that one adds two for all candidates from b<j<r S j . For the initialization, one has to adapt the definition of D − S appropriately as well (used in line 06). To have a sufficient initialization of the dynamic programming Trying out all possible subsets S ⊆ {1, . . . , p} and appropiate subsets S r , we obviously consider all possible positionings of c after some switches in a vote. Since we take the minimum number of switches over all these possibilities, the modified DodScore algorithm works correctly. Since Observation 1 and Observation 2 still hold, the running time bound follows similar to the proof of Lemma 2; taking into account that an update step needs 3 k · k time. PROOF. We employ a parameterized reduction from the W[2]-complete Dominating Set problem [10] : Given an undirected graph G = (W, E) and a positive integer k, the task is to decide whether there exists a dominating set of size k, that is, a subset of vertices W ′ ⊆ W with |W ′ | ≤ k such that every vertex of W either belongs to W ′ or has at least one neighbor in it.
The basic idea for the reduction is as follows. We associate a candidate with every vertex of the graph. In a first set of votes, for every vertex i of the graph we construct a vote such that the candidates that correspond to the vertices of the closed neighborhood of i are positioned better than the distinguished candidate c; these vertices are ranked equally such that one can build a tie between c and all of them by one switch. Then, we add a second set of votes of same size in which c cannot improve upon any of the "vertex candidates" with at most k switches. This is done by inserting dummy candidates. That is, in total we achieve that for every vertex candidate the number of votes in which it is worse than c equals the number of votes in which it is better than c. Then, the votes of the first set that are affected by switches correspond to the vertices of a dominating set.
In the following, we give the formal construction. Given a Dominating Set instance (G = (W, E), k), we construct a DTS1-instance (V, C, c, k) as follows:
The set of candidates consists of one candidate for every vertex, the distinguished candidate c, and 2k additional dummy candidates, that is, C :
We denote the subset of candidates that corresponds to the closed neighborhood of a vertex i by
and, the set of remaining vertex candidates by
We define the vote set V := V 1 ∪ V 2 as follows:
Clearly, c already defeats all of the dummy candidates f 1 , . . . , f 2k . In addition, consider an arbitrary vertex candidate c i . For every vote from V 1 in which c i is better (worse) than c there is a vote from V 2 in which c i is worse (better) than c. That is, we have to decrease the deficit of every vertex candidate by at least one.
We show that the distinguished candidate c can become the Condorcet winner by k switches if and only if the Dominating Set instance has a solution of size k.
"⇐": Given a dominating set W ′ of size k, we claim that applying exactly one switch to each vote of V 1 that has its corresponding vertex in W ′ is a solution for the DTS1 instance. This claim is correct since W ′ is a dominating set and one switch in a vote v i ∈ V 1 leads to a tie with c and the whole closed neighborhood of vertex i. Therefore, the deficits of all candidates are decreased to at most zero after these switches. "⇒": Given a solution S using k switches for the DTS1 instance, we can assume that the votes in V 2 are not affected by the switches in S. This assumption is justified due to the fact that, by switching at most k times even within one vote in V 2 , one can only improve upon dummy candidates. Furthermore, one switch within a vote in V 1 decreases the deficits of all candidates that are better than c in this vote by one, since all these candidates are ranked equally. Since in every vote from V 1 one can apply at most one switch, S affects exactly k votes from V 1 . Since all vertex candidates have deficit 1, each of them appears at least once better than c in the votes affected by S. Due to the above construction, the set of vertices {i | v i ∈ S} is obviously a dominating set of size k in G. PROOF. By the fact that the number of switches is a lower bound for the total switch cost, it suffices to show containment in W [2] with respect to the number of switches as the parameter. More precisely, we show containment in W [2] by giving a parameterized reduction to a variant of the k-Weighted Circuit Satisfiability (k-WCS) problem that defines W[2] [9] . The k-WCS problem has as input a circuit and a positive integer k, and asks whether it has a weight-k satisfying assignment (an assignment setting the values of exactly k input gates to 1). Here, we use that a parameterized problem is in W [2] if it is parameterized reducible to k-WCS restricted to circuits satisfying the following two conditions [9] :
(1) On every input-output path, the number of gates with unbounded fan-in is at most two. (2) The length of the longest input-output path is bounded by a function only depending on the parameter.
Given an election (V, C), a distinguished candidate c, and a positive integer k, we construct a corresponding Boolean expression E as follows. Intuitively, the variables represent the positions that candidate c can take by switching within the set of votes. Let e i denote the number of switches needed such that c becomes the best ranked candidate in vote v i . Having a set of equally ranked candidates, c can improve with one switch upon all of them, and, in this case, the "position" of c is increased by one. In addition, we have k copies of every variable that corresponds to a position in a vote. Thus, the set of variables for E is
is true means that the information that in vote v i one has switched to position j is stored in copy s. For a vote v i , we use C(i, j) to denote the set of candidates upon which c improves with the jth switch in v i .
We construct E = E 1 ∧ E 2 ∧ E 3 ∧ E 4 as follows:
(1) The expression E 1 ensures that in each of the k copies of the positions variables exactly one position variable is true in a satisfying assignment:
Herein, the second " " quantifies over all i, i ′ ∈ {1, . . . , n} and the corresponding j, j ′ ∈ {1, . . . , e i }. (2) The expression E 2 ensures that at most one copy of a variable can be true in a satisfying assignment:
To switch the distinguished candidate c for the j-th time in vote v i , we must have switched it j − 1 times in v i before. This is simulated by the expression E 3 as follows:
The most important part of the construction is to ensure that the deficit of every candidate is decreased to zero or below zero. For any candidate c x ∈ C, let d x denote its deficit. Then, expression E 4 ensures that at least d x variables p[i, j, s] with c x ∈ C(i, j) must be set to 1. Let S(k, r) denote the set of all size-r subsets of {1, . . . , k}.
In E 4 , the two innermost quantifications range over sets whose sizes are bounded by functions depending only on k. Therefore, the Boolean expression E can be easily transformed into conjunctive normal form (as required for the W[2]-characterization [9] ), making use of the fact that the middle Orand And-quantifiers in E 4 can be equivalently replaced by a Or-and Andquantifiers with changed order.
Let the weight of a truth assignment denote the number of variables set to 1.
The following claim completes the proof.
Claim: Formula E is satisfiable by a weight-k satisfying truth assignment if and only if c can be made a Condorcet winner by applying k switches.
"⇐": Given a set of k switches that make c a Condorcet winner, construct a weight-k truth assignment as follows.
Number the switches from 1 to k and then set the "corresponding" variable to true. That is, if the switch with number q brings candidate c in vote i into position j, then set p[i, j, q] := true. The remaining variables with s = q are set to false.
As for every q with 1 ≤ q ≤ k we set exactly one variable p[i, j, q] to true, the expression E 1 is true. Since every two distinct switches operate on distinct votes or they move the distinguished candidate to distinct positions in the same vote, the expression E 2 is true. As the switches within one vote have to be contiguous, E 3 is true. Finally, for candidate c x we must have that c improves upon c x in at least d x votes. For this reason, there must be a size-d x subset of switches with c x ∈ C(i, j), and E 4 is true.
"⇒": Given a weight-k satisfying truth assignment for E, construct a solution for DTS1 by choosing the corresponding switches, that is, for every variable p[i, j, s] that is true move c in vote v i to position j. The expression E 1 ensures that we apply exactly k switches, E 2 ensures that every switch is made only once, and E 3 ensures that in one vote all switches are contiguous. Finally, E 4 makes sure that for every candidate the deficit is sufficiently reduced. 2
Combining Lemmas 3 and 4, one arrives at the following.
Theorem 3 Dodgson Tie Score 1 is W [2]-complete with respect to the parameter k.
Young Score
In this section, we show that Young Score and Dual Young Score are W[2]-complete with respect to their corresponding solution size bounds l and k, respectively. From a parameterized perspective Dual Young Score appears to be more natural than Young Score because for Dual Young Score one may expect smaller parameter values.
For both problems, similar to Dodgson Score, it is helpful to consider a deficit concept for a candidate d ∈ C\{c} against the distinguished candidate c: Let N d denote the number of votes from V in which d defeats c, that is, in which d is better positioned than c. Then, the Young deficit is defined as
We start with a W[2]-hardness-proof for Dual Young Score, giving two parameterized reductions: The first reduction is from the W[2]-hard Red Blue Dominating Set (RBDS) [10] to an intermediate problem, which is a variant of Red Blue Dominating Set, and then the second one is from the intermediate problem to Dual Young Score.
Red Blue Dominating Set (RBDS) Given: A bipartite graph G = (R ∪ B, E), with R and B being the two disjoint vertex sets, and an integer k ≥ 0. Question: Is there a subset D ⊆ R of size at most k such that every vertex in B has at least one neighbor in D?
The intermediate problem is defined as follows:
, with R and B being the two disjoint vertex sets, and an integer k ≥ 0. Question: Is there a subset D ⊆ R of size at most k such that every vertex in B has at least ⌊k/2⌋ + 1 neighbors in D?
PROOF. We give a parameterized reduction from RBDS. For an RBDS instance (G = (B ∪ R, E), k), the corresponding instance (
-RBDS is constructed as follows:
The following claim finishes the proof.
Claim: The considered RBDS-instance is a yes-instance if and only if the k/2-RBDS-instance is a yes-instance. Next, we give a parameterized reduction from k/2-RBDS to Dual Young Score.
PROOF. Given a k/2-RBDS-instance (G = (B∪R, E), k) with B = {b 1 , ..., b m } and R = {r 1 , ..., r n }, we first consider the case that k is odd. The corresponding Dual Young Score instance is constructed as follows. We set C :
that is, the candidates in N C (r i ) correspond to the neighbors of r i in G and N C (r i ) corresponds to the rest of the vertices in B. Construct three disjoint subsets of votes, V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 :
• The votes in V 1 correspond to the red vertices in R. For every red vertex r i , add a vote v i to V 1 in which the candidates in N C (r i ) ∪ {a, b} are better than c and the candidates in N C (r i ) are worse than c. More precisely,
Note that, here and in the following, if there is a set in a vote, then the order of the elements in the set is irrelevant and can be fixed arbitrarily.
• The set V 2 also contains n votes. These votes guarantee that in V 1 ∪ V 2 the deficit of b is 2k − 2 whereas the deficit of each other candidate is zero.
Later, it will become clear that the (2k − 2)-deficit of b will be used to argue that all votes in a solution of a Dual Young Score instance have to come from V 1 .
• The set V 3 consists of k − 1 votes to adjust the deficits of a and b so that in Finally, the overall set V of votes is V 1 ∪ V 2 ∪ V 3 and the upper bound for the solution size of the Dual Young Score instance is set to k. The key idea behind the above construction is that to reduce the (k − 1)-deficits of a and b by deleting at most k votes, all solutions of the Dual Young Score instance actually contain exactly k votes from V 1 . The reason for this is that the votes in V 1 are the only votes whose deletion simultaneously reduces the deficits of a and b against c.
In the following, we show that c can become the Condorcet winner by deleting at most k votes if and only if there is a dominating set of size at most k for the (G, k). Recall that in the definition of V 3 it is decisive that k is odd. Now, we consider the case that k is even and give a reduction from Dual Young Score with an odd k to Dual Young Score with an even k. Given a Dual Young Score instance (V, C, c, k) with k being odd, we add a new vote v to V that has the form: "C \ {c} > c" to get the new vote set V ′ . Then (V ′ , C, c, k ′ := k + 1) is a Dual Young Score instance with k ′ being even. The correspondence between the solutions is easy to achieve. 2
To prove that Dual Young Score is W[2]-complete, it remains to show its containment in W [2] . To this end, we construct a parameterized reduction from Dual Young Score to the following W[2]-complete problem [5] also arising in the context of election systems:
Optimal Lobbying
Given: An n×m 0/1-matrix M, a length-m 0/1-vector x, and an integer k ≥ 0. Question: Is there a choice of at most k rows from M such that the selected rows can be edited in a way that, in the resulting matrix, it holds that if x has a 0 in its ith entry, then there are more 0's than 1's in the ith column, and if x has a 1 in its ith entry, then there are more 1's than 0's in the ith column?
By editing a row, we mean to change some 1's in the row to 0's and/or to change some 0's to 1's. We call x the target vector.
PROOF. We give a parameterized reduction to Optimal Lobbying. We focus on instances (V, C, c, k) of Dual Young Score with n − 3k > 0 where n := |V |. The instances with n − 3k ≤ 0 can be trivially solved by enumerating all size-≤ k subsets of V , which can be done in O( The matrix of the Optimal Lobbying instance consists of two submatrices. First, observe that in the Dual Young Score instance the exact ordering of the candidates in a vote is irrelevant, the key point here concerns the relative positions of the candidates compared to the distinguished candidate c. Therefore, one can easily transform a vote into a length-(m − 1) 0/1-vector where each candidate from C \ {c} has an entry. If a candidate c i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 is better than c in the vote, then set the ith entry of the vector to 0; otherwise, set it to 1. Putting all these binary vectors together, one obtains an n×(m−1) 0/1-matrix. Adding an all-0 column to this matrix as the mth column results in the first submatrix M 1 of the Optimal Lobbying instance to be constructed.
Second, construct a size-(n − 2k + 1) × m matrix M 2 as follows. Set all entries of the mth column of M 2 to 1's. In each of the other m − 1 columns, set the first ⌈(n − 3k)/2⌉ entries to 1's and the rest to 0's. ′ is a solution of the Optimal Lobbying instance. This means that, after editing all 0's in the rows from S ′ to 1's, every column of the resulting matrix has more 1's than 0's, "justifying" the target vector. Obviously, the claim is true for the mth column, since the mth column has n − 2k + 1 1-entries in M 2 and only 0-entries in M 1 . In particular, the rows from S ′ have 0's in the mth column. Therefore, after editing the 0's in the rows from S ′ , one gets exactly n − k + 1 1's and n − k 0's in the mth column. As the distinguished candidate c is a Condorcet winner after deleting S, it must be better than c i in more than half of the votes of V \S. Thus, by construction, we have
Moreover, we additionally get k 1-entries by the edited entries of S ′ and in M 2 we have ⌈(n − 3k/2)⌉ 1-entries. Thus, for the total number of 1's in the matrix M ′′ resulting from editing S ′ in M, one gets that
Since the number of rows of the matrix M ′′ is 2n − 2k + 1, one gets that
Hence, the target vector (1, . . . , 1) is realized and editing S ′ in the considered way gives a solution for the Optimal Lobbying instance.
"⇐": In order to validate the all-1 target vector for the mth column, all size-k solutions S ′ of the Optimal Lobbying instance contain only rows from M 1 . Hence, one can easily construct a size-k subset S ⊆ V by choosing the corresponding votes. To show that S is a solution of the Dual Young Score instance, one needs to show that for every candidate c i with 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, in V ′ := V \S the distinguished candidate c is better than c i in at least ⌊(n − k)/2⌋ + 1 votes, that is, in M 1 \S ′ there must be at least ⌊(n − k)/2⌋ + 1 entries of the i'th column that are set to 1.
Assume that # 1 (M 1 \S ′ [i]) ≤ ⌊(n − k)/2⌋. By editing the entries of S ′ , the number of rows which contain 1's can be increased at most by k. Thus, in total,
where M ′′ is the matrix resulting from editing S ′ in M.
Since, there are 2n − 2k + 1 rows in total, # 0 (M ′′ [i]) must be at least n − k + 1, and, therefore, # 0 (M
. As a consequence, S ′ cannot be a solution for the Optimal Lobbying instance with target vector (1, . . . , 1). 2
Combining Lemmas 6 and 7, we arrive at the main result of this section. 
Conclusion and Outlook
Probably the most important general observation deriving from our work is that Dodgson and Young elections behave differently with respect to the parameter "number of editing operations". Whereas for Dodgson elections we achieve fixed-parameter tractability, we experience parameterized intractability in case of Young elections. This stands in sharp contrast to traditional complexity analysis, where both election systems appear as equally hard [1, 16, 25] , and complements results on polynomial-time approximability [3] . Furthermore, we found that the complexities of Dodgson elections allowing ties between the candidates strongly vary (fixed-parameter tractability vs W[2]-completeness) depending on the cost model for switching ties. Again, in the standard complexity framework these two cases cannot be differentiated because both lead to NP-completeness.
We conclude with some specific open questions directly arising from our work. Regarding Dodgson Score, it would be interesting to investigate the power of polynomial-time data reduction and the existence of (small) problem kernels (see [14] for a survey on problem kernels which play a key role in parameterized algorithmics). Moreover, there are open questions regarding other parameterizations (see also Table 1 ): Bartholdi et al. [1] gave an integer linear program which implies the fixed-parameter tractability of Dodgson Score with respect to the parameter "number of candidates" (also see [20] for further results in this direction). Unfortunately, the corresponding running times are extremely high and a more efficient combinatorial algorithm would be desirable; the same holds for Young Score. The parameterized complexity of Dodgson Score with respect to the parameter "number of votes" remains open-we conjecture W[1]-hardness based on some preliminary evidence. Finally, it would be interesting to study typical values of Dodgson scores under reasonable distributions for preference profiles. Thus, a subject of study could be to find out what the probability of having a candidate with "low" Dodgson score is. This would help to better assess the practical potential of the described fixed-parameter algorithm for Dodgson Score.
